

A N
E N Q U I R Y

Into the
P R E T E N S I O N S

O F

Spain to Gibraltar,

As founded on
His Late Majesty's LETTER

T O T H E

C A T H O L I C K K I N G :

Together with a C O P Y thereof,

A N D A

Brief A N S W E R to the said P R E T E N S I O N S.

The S E C O N D E D I T I O N , with A D D I T I O N S .

L O N D O N :

Printed for R. W A L K E R at the *White Hart*
without *Temple Bar*, and sold by the Book-
sellers of *London* and *Westminster*. 1729.
(Price Six-pence.)

1060



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644/9

ERRATA.

PAGE 1. line 1. for *Reason* read *Season*: p. 8. l. 8.
r. a *private-spirited*. p. 11. l. 13. for *the* r. *their*.
p. 16. l. 15. dele *sp.* p. 20. l. 19. in the King's Letter
for *honourable*, some Copies r. *favourable*.

INTRODUCTION.

THE following Tract is, according to its Title, *An Enquiry into the Pretensions* which the *Spaniards* (or rather, a Party among us who make themselves Advocates for *Spain*) make upon *Gibraltar*; and upon the foot of which, as a Reason *fine qua non*, they seem to decline the *Peace*, at least do not give a positive *Declaration*, upon the Conditions laid down by the rest of the *Allies*.

It is worth observing, previous to examining their Pretensions, the very odd and particular Manner in which the *Spaniards* have managed the same, and the Measures they have taken upon them; seeming not only not to value the Provoking a powerful Nation (as I think we may venture without Boasting to call ourselves) but to resolve to try, whether that Nation could be provok'd or no: They have indeed made an Experiment or two, in which they have made themselves the Subject of *Europe's* Jest, rather than of their Resentment; and his Majesty has thought fit to content himself with only repulsing them, without carrying his Resentment on (as he was able to do) to their due Correction and Confusion; it will be their Wisdom to take Care they do not make one Experiment too many, and carry their Jest too far, since it is much easier to keep Friends than appease Enemies, or reconcile an injur'd Nation when thoroughly provoked.

Some

Some have blamed the *English*, for bearing so many Insults from the *Spaniards*, when it is well known here how able we have been to revenge our own Wrongs, but more may hereafter blame the *Spaniards*, for offering so many Injuries to a Nation, which they are so ill able to defend themselves against.

It must be confess'd, it looks as if the Reverse of this was the Case, and that the *Spaniards* had a quite contrary Opinion, both of the *English* Power, and of their own, that they really thought themselves a Match for the *British* Nation; and that, on the other hand, the Crown of *Great-Britain* was afraid to break with them.

But they that think thus, must greatly mistake the Court of *Madrid*, who are not so weak in the Head as that comes to, and who have too often felt the Inequality of Strength between their Power and ours, especially at Sea, to have any such Notions.

They know no Nation in the World is so able to wound them in the most tender Part, *viz.* their *American* Interest, as the *British*; and that they are no Way equal to the *English* Naval Power in that Part of the World: The *Spanish* Fools are all dead; they are too wise and knowing in their own Affairs, to act upon such a Foundation of Mistakes as these are.

It must be then from a Politick of another Kind, they must have some foreign Dependance, some auxiliar Interest to support and encourage them; whether this be, as some would insinuate, that they have a treacherous Intelligence among his *Britannick* Majesty's Subjects, who, being supported by *Spanish* Money, and encouraged by *Spanish* Promises, may, in return, give the *Spaniards* Hopes of making a Diversion at home, or whether they are playing
the

the Game (often suggested) of a Defection among the Allies, I say, be it which of these two it will, 'tis probable they may be disappointed in both.

As to the disaffected Party at home, they must have very bad Intelligence, if they promise themselves any thing on that Side; the wretched Cause of the Pretender and his Adherents is in such a reduc'd Condition, that the *Spaniards*, if they know any thing of Affairs in *Britain*, must know it is neither in their Power to revive it, or worth the Expence to make the Attempt; that Interest being headless and helpless, and worth no Prince's while to espouse it.

As to their Dependance being upon the Dissatisfaction of any of the allied Powers, it may be answer'd thus, 'They found themselves mistaken once already, when they presumed *France* would not draw the Sword against them in this Quarrel; whereas *France* pouring in an Army upon the Frontiers of *Navarre*, made such a Diversion in Favour of the Quadruple Alliance, as obliged the *Spaniards* to sit still, and see all their Conquests wrung out of their Hands, and to give up *Sicily* to the Emperor; and what can be said why it should be less the Interest of *France* now, to preserve the Balance of *Europe*, than it was then?

The Allies have all the Assurances on that Side, that *France*, or indeed any Nation can well give, of her being steady to all her Engagements, and standing heartily by her Allies; but besides that, it is apparent that she is engaged by her Interest (the strongest National Bond in the World) to be so. It would be too long a Work here, to give a particular Account how unalterably it is the Interest of *France*, to support the Allies of the *Hanover* Treaty; but it is so known a Maxim in *Europe's* Politick's, that the Greatness of the House of *Austria*,
and

and of the House of *Bourbon*, can never consist together, that I need spend no time about it; the Histories of *Europe*, in all Ages since *Charlemain*, make it evident indeed that it is so in Fact; and those of the Empire and *France*, from the Reign of the Emperor *Charles V.* and *Francis I.* in *France*, give us the true Reason of it, namely, the several Pretensions of both those Nations to the same Dominions, such as the *Milanes*e and *Mantuan*, and other Countries in *Italy*, and to the Estates of the House of *Burgundy* in the Empire, and on the Borders of *France*.

These Countries are all now revolved upon the House of *Austria*, such was the Fate of Things in the late War, and none can say that *France* looks on those Accessions of Power to the Emperor with any Satisfaction, or believe that she will, on any fair Occasion, fail of regaining what she has lost; much less will she add to that Power which is, on that Account, become an uneasy Neighbour; so that while *Spain* is thus aggrandizing the House of *Austria*, and acts in Concert with the Court of *Vienna*, she can hardly suggest any Assistance from *France*, in a Step so inconsistent with the known Interest of the *French* Monarchy.

What other Dependance *Spain* can have, is wholly mysterious, and like to remain so, 'till Time shall discover it; and I cannot but believe it is the Interest of the Allies on many Accounts to push the Discovery, that we may see (as we usually express it) *who and who's together*, who are Friends and who are Enemies; who are for his Majesty's keeping his Hold, and preserving his Possession of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mabone*, and who are not; and then we shall no longer be at a Loss to know what is next to be done, or amuse ourselves about *War* or *Peace*.

A N

ENQUIRY, &c.

THIS is a strange Reason for Amusement; the *wise Men* of the Age seem to be perplexing themselves wonderfully about *Something* and *Nothing*, and making a mighty Noise of Words, to the least Purpose imaginable, when at the same Time a little serious Debating the grand Question would bring them all to understand one another presently.

One Sort of People tell us, the *Spaniards* MUST and WILL have *Gibraltar*; while others inform us, that there are *SOME* of our *Friends* who are willing we should

f B

give

give it up. I must acknowledge I cannot reckon them among the Number of *our* Friends; I think there is much more Reason to take them *so*, who are for our *keeping it*, especially when I consider what it has *cost Us*, not so much in the taking it at first, (for that was done happily and easily enough) but in *Strengthening, Fortifying,* and keeping it when, (not only in the *former War*, but last Summer during a State of *Peace*, or at least of *Truce*) the *Spaniards* so vigorously attack'd it, though to so little Purpose.

That his MAJESTY has an *undoubted Right* to the *Possession* of it; I am (besides my private Opinion which is clear in the Case) confirm'd in the Belief of, as well from the *joint Address* of the *British* Parliament lately made publick, as from His Majesty's Answer to the said Address;

dress; in both which it is expressly call'd an *Undoubted Right*, and that on the most solemn Occasions.

If it be His Majesty's *undoubted Right*, as most *certain* it is, it seems to me as *unalienable* a Branch of the Dominion of the *British* Crown as any *other* whatsoever; and I cannot entertain the least Suspicion (or so much as Suggestion) that his Majesty will suffer any of the *Rights* and Possessions of the *British* Crown to be as it were torn away or snatch'd from it, while H E wears it.

The *Importance* of the Place itself to the *British* Nation, and to our *Commerce*, is an Argument which some People lay very great Stress upon, and make much use of, on this Occasion; and much indeed might be said upon that Subject. But I would rather chuse to *wave* that Argument

for the present, and insist chiefly on its being His Majesty's *Right* : I think the *latter* much firmer and more cogent in the Case before us; for were it ten-fold more *important* than it is, if it were not just to keep it, if it were not his Majesty's *Rightful Possession*, nay, his *undoubted Right*, the KING is too *just* to desire, and too *powerful* a Prince to stand in Need of it.

As in Behalf of *Great Britain*, it may be said without Vanity, That the KING does not *want* any Thing that is *not* his *Own*; so it would be too mean a Way of Thinking, to imagine his Majesty would *part* with any thing that is his *undoubted Right*. It is no Answer to a *Creditor*, when he Demands a just *Debt*, to say, *He does not want the Money*; every body wants his *own*.

Hence

Hence the *Importance*, or no *Importance* of the *Place* is dismiss'd the Dispute, and quite out of Question, by which also we at once get rid of the Clamour of those who would argue, as they think very forcibly too, *against parting with it*, not so much for its being our *Right*, as because of its vast *Importance* to our Commerce.

It is true, if it was not in our Possession, but that a War was to *ensue*, or not *ensue* for the getting it into our Hands, the *Importance* of the *Place* would militate strongly for our *obtaining* it, as being infinitely *valuable*, and worth contending for: And this may indeed be a forcible Argument on the *Spaniards's* Side, as the Case now stands, *Why they should*, if possible, regain it. There is no doubt but it is of much more
 Impor-

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 Impor-

Importance to *them* to regain it, than it is to *Us* to maintain our Possession: But what then, Thanks to our Stars, the Affirmative is in our Favour, the *Possession* is secur'd, and the *Place* is ours; be the *Import* more or less, our *Right* is the same, and that is to be maintained, because the King will never abandon his *undoubted Right*.

I might take this Occasion to expostulate a little here, not with our Enemies so much as with some People who call themselves *our Friends*, (that is, Friends to the Interest of *Great Britain*) and seem *cold* in the Question on *our Side*, not only as if they were indifferent whether the *British Crown* should keep *Possession* of *Gibraltar*, but as if they were really rather for the contrary.

N. B.

N. B. I do not now speak of those People as in a publick and politick Capacity, *as a Nation* or Body, though it may be true of them *Nationally* also, for ought I know; I leave that Indifferent for the Reader to argue as he sees Cause; but I speak of *private Persons* as they are pleas'd to hint on this Subject in common Discourse.

Those People insinuate their private Judgment against our possessing this important Fortrefs: Why should *Great Britain*, say they, expect that all *Europe*, that is to say, all her Allies, should engage in a War for continuing Us in Possession of *one Town*, which they are not to be much the better for it when it is done? Nay, which perhaps some of them had much rather were in other Hands,

Hands, and that if *Great Britain* will contend for such a Possession, the *Benefit* of which is to be so very particular to themselves, they should support the *Expence* thereof, and the like.

I should not have mention'd such a *private-spirited* and ungenerous *Scruple* as this, if I had not met with it in Conversation upon several Occasions; wherein People have suggested, that even our own *Allies* are not the most willing People in the World that we should enjoy this important Place now we have it.

I am willing to vindicate our *Allies* from *this* Charge, as I believe it to derogate from their Honour. And I do this in a particular Manner from the Freedom with which all the *Allies* came into the first conceding the Possession to us at the Peace of
Utretcht,

Utrecht, where I never heard that any of them opposed it. It was indeed a *Conquest* made by the *British* Valour, and became ours by the Right of the Sword, being taken in a fair War; and as no Objection can lie against our Possession on that Side, so I believe from thence, no Force, but that of the *Sword*, will ever wring it out of our Hands: How likely that Force is to prevail, the fruitless Attempts that have hitherto been made upon it, seem to give us Leave to guess, that we need be in no great Pain about it.

But, in my Opinion, there seems to be a little *Secret* Ill-nature in this Suggestion, come from what Corner it will; for why should any of *our Allies* so much as seem to repine at our Possessing a *Place* which *Providence*, and our *own Valour*, threw into our Hands *in the Right of War*?

C

And

And which *They*, I mean the *Allies*, neither at *that* Time, nor any other that I heard of, laid any *Claim* to, nor so much as made any *Pretensions* to a Right or Claim at the Time of making the Peace. I have therefore Reason to imagine that they do *not repine at it*, or so much as *wish* it were in any other Hands than our *Own*.

As to the other Suggestion, namely, *That our Allies would cast the Expence of a War*, if such should happen, *upon us*, because made upon *our* Account, and to preserve a Possession to *Us* which they have *no Concern* in, is indeed too ungenerous to suppose, and favours too much of a *private* Spirit to imagine it should come from any of the Allies in their *National* and *Allied* Capacity, and therefore deserves no *Answer* as such:
For

[II]

For what is more *just*, and what Stipulations more frequent, between any *ally'd Powers*, where the Alliances which are between them are of a publick Nature, than that if any of the said *contracted Powers* are attack'd, or any way disturbed or molested in the peaceable possession of any of the stipulated Acquisitions of the preceeding Wars, wherein they were mutually engag'd, all the other *Allies* shall join their *Forces*, either their *utmost Forces*, or the *formerly-stipulated Quota's*, for the Defending the said *Ally*, and for the Preserving to them the Possessions so stipulated by their former Agreement?

I refer, in the particular Case before me, to the *Treaties* of the *Grand Alliance*, on the Foot of which the *last War* against *France* was carried

on; and to the Treaty of Peace made at *Utrecht*, by which the *undoubted Right* of Possession of *Gibraltar* is given up to the *British Crown*: Which *Treaties* will answer all Objections of this Kind: And I may, I hope, with good Reason conclude, that none of *our Allies* will recede from, or in the least act contrary to, the Honour due to those *Treaties*.

Upon the whole, I believe I may safely be allow'd to build upon the Foundation of the *Addresses* of both Houses to the King, mentioned above, and his Majesty's *Answer* to them; in both which, if I understand them, or may be allowed to deliver my Thoughts freely, with all possible Regard to the *Authority* of my Superiors, the main and most essential Reason, why the Possession of *Gibraltar* is to be preserv'd to the
Crown

Crown of *Great Britain*, is laid down, and brought into the same narrow Compass which I have, namely, that it is his Majesty's *Undoubted Right*, and therefore ought to be preserv'd. If the Possession be his Majesty's *Undoubted Right*, I shall go no farther, as above hinted, for a Reason why it should be maintained, and that at the utmost Hazard and Expence: For why should any of his Majesty's *Rightful Possessions*, or *Dominions*, be attack'd, or so much as attempted to be taken from him? Here I leave it as a Point granted by every *loyal* and *well-affected* Subject of *Great Britain*: What Faction and Parties may introduce among us to the contrary, I cannot answer for.

But we have a *New Meteor* discover'd in this *Airy System*, and one whose Original I cannot trace out,
no,

no, not by any means; namely, that the *Spaniards* will not make any *Treaty* of Peace with the King of *great Britain* without *Gibraltar* being restored to *Spain* for an **EQUIVALENT**. This *Equivalent* is an Amusement thrown in by I know not what kind of *Politician*, any more than I can imagine how such an absurd piece of *Intelligence* should find its Way into the World by the **DAI-LY COURANT**; for there it seems it made its *first* and chief Appearance.

This *Phænomenon* of an *Equivalent* has hitherto amused *Us* with its Name only; for not one of the Writers who have published the same thing from, or coteremporary with the *Courant*, has given the least Hint by which we might judge what it means, or what we may suppose it to consist of.

By an *Equivalent*, it is evident,
must

must be understood some *valuable* just Consideration to be given by the *Spaniards*, who desire the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, in lieu thereof, to the **ENGLISH** who are to *part* with it: And this, as I take it, must consist of some *Place* to be exchang'd for it, equally *important*, or some sufficient, satisfactory *Sum of Money* to be paid for it.

As to the *first*, it would be worth while for us to consider, what *Place* of equal importance the *Spaniards* have to give? Upon that foot I dare affirm, that, large and extensive as their *Dominions* are in *Europe*, as well as *America*, they have not one *City* or *Town* in their whole Government, to name as an equivalent for *Gibraltar*, but what has one of these two Difficulties attending the Exchange, *viz.*

- I. That the *Spaniards* will not *part* with it. Or,
- II.

II. That the King of *Great Britain* would not accept of it.

Suppose I should name *some Places* that I think would be worth our while to accept; such as, for *Instance*, the *Havana*, *Chartagena*, *Panama* or *Lima*, in *America*; or its *Neighbours*, the *Cities* of *Malaga*, *Cadiz*, *Seville* *Barcellona*, to go no farther, in *Europe*, what would the *Spaniards* say of them, but that you might as well ask *Madrid* or *Mexico*? And as for small *Places* of no *Importance*, that would do as little on the other side: So that an ~~an~~ *Equivalent* by way of *Exchange* may be suppos'd to be very improbable on both sides.

As to a certain *Sum of Money* for an *Equivalent*; we have had such bad Luck in selling of *Dunkirk*, that I verily believe, no *Minister of State* will

will ever come into the *like*, or give his *Vote* for the selling *another* Town, after its being once annexed to the *British* Empire: So that they must tell us farther what they mean by this *Equivalent*, or what it is to be, before we can say any more to it.

The only Resource which the Friends of *Spain* seem to have left in this Case is, a certain Letter which they say was written by A. in the Name of B. and sent to C. I believe I need explain myself no farther, since we see daily Copies of it in MS. handed about privately in Coffee-houses and elsewhere from one to another; so that it is not in the main any great Secret.

This Letter, they say, contains a Promise of *restoring Gibraltar* to the King of *Spain*; of which I shall at present

D

present think proper to observe two or three Particulars, and no more.

First, That I do not pretend to assert, that the *Paper* so handed about the Town, though it is said in some Copies to have been written by the late KING, was *really* so; nor indeed will I so much as think it, till I have farther Grounds to believe it than I yet see; the Royal Style, in my Opinion, being generally quite different from it.

Secondly, That if it is *genuine*, I do not think it contains a *Promise* for the restoring *Gibraltar* to the King of *Spain*, any otherwise than as the Parliament of *Great Britain* should regulate and adjust it. And

Thirdly, That as the Parliament has not come into it, but seem to have (especially at this Time) given another

another Turn to that Affair; I cannot see any Obligations arising from the Contents of the *said Letter*, either upon the *Sovereign*, or the *Parliament* now in being, to make any such Surrender of *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, as they are said to *expect*.

This, I hope, I may be allowed to say without Offence on *one Side* or *the other*, believing that those People who would have *Us give up* this valuable Pledge of the **ENGLISH VALOUR**, will find very little Advantage in their Argument, from any Thing to be seen in the following Letter.

S I R,

Jan. 1, 1721

My BROTHER,

“ I Have learned with great Satisfaction by the Report of my
 “ Ambassador at your Court, that
 “ your

“ your Majesty is at last resolved to
 “ remove the Obstacles that have
 “ some time delayed the entire Ac-
 “ complishment of our Union, since,
 “ from the Confidence your Majesty
 “ expresses towards me, I may look
 “ upon the Treaties which have been
 “ in Question between us, as re-
 “ established, and that accordingly
 “ the Instruments necessary for the
 “ carrying on of the Trade of my
 “ Subjects will be delivered out.
 “ I do no longer * *Ballance* to as-
 “ sure your Majesty of my Readiness
 “ to satisfy you, with Regard
 “ to your Demand touching the
 “ Restitution of *Gibraltar*, promising
 “ you to make use of the first
 “ favourable Opportunity to regulate
 “ this Article with the Consent
 “ of my Parliament; and, to give

* *It may, perhaps, be thus translated, I make no longer any Difficulty to assure, &c.*

“ your

“ your Majesty a full Proof of my
 “ Affection, I have ordered my
 “ Ambassador, as soon as the Ne-
 “ gotiation with which he hath been
 “ charged shall be finished, to pro-
 “ pose to your Majesty new En-
 “ gagements to be enter’d into in
 “ Concert, and jointly with *France*,
 “ suitable to the present Conjun-
 “ cture, not only for the Strength-
 “ ning our Union, but also for
 “ securing the Tranquility of *Eu-*
 “ *rope*. Your Majesty may be per-
 “ suaded that I, on my Part, will
 “ shew all the Facility imaginable,
 “ promising myself that you will
 “ do the same, for the mutual Be-
 “ nefit of our Kingdoms; being most
 “ perfectly, &c.

I might add to this, that had this
 Pretence of a *Letter* been *just*, or had
 the Contents of it imply’d an Obli-
 gation absolutely to restore this Place;
 yet

yet it does not appear that it was to have been done immediately; and without, or before any farther Treaty, concerting and agreeing of *other Matters*, (then in Debate) and which were left at that Time to be more fully debated or propos'd at the *Congress* of Ministers, which (as is now at *Soissons*) was then in the same Manner appointed at *Cambray*. So that upon the whole Matter I may conclude, since the said *Letter* has been lately canvass'd in Parliament, and his Majesty address'd thereupon, I do not see the least Room to infer, that it makes any thing to the Advantage of those, who would have it understood in favour of *Spain*.



FINIS.

